Τζέσε Τζάκσον 1941-2026: Μετατρέποντας το “Όνειρο” σε Πολιτική Πραγματικότητα

Τζέσε Τζάκσον 1941-2026: Μετατρέποντας το “Όνειρο” σε Πολιτική Πραγματικότητα

Άρθρο στην εφημερίδα ΤΑ ΝΕΑ ΣΑΒΒΑΤΟΚΥΡΙΑΚΟ, 28-02/ 01-03-2026.

Η εικόνα του Jesse Jackson να κλαίει με λυγμούς στην επινίκια ομιλία του Ομπάμα στο Σικάγο το 2008, συμπυκνώνει την Οδύσσεια των Αφροαμερικανών. Ο Jesse Jackson ήταν ο Αφροαμερικανός ακτιβιστής πολιτικός που συνέδεσε δυο εποχές.  Αυτός που παρέλαβε τη σκυτάλη των κοινωνικών αγώνων για την κατάργηση των φυλετικών διακρίσεων από τον Martin Luther King και την παρέδωσε στον Obama. Έπαιξε καθοριστικό ρόλο στη μετατροπή των κατακτήσεων του κινήματος για τα πολιτικά δικαιώματα σε πολιτική πραγματικότητα, ανοίγοντας τον δρόμο για την εκλογή του πρώτου Αφροαμερικανού  προέδρου.

Όλη του η πολιτεία ήταν ένα επίμονο κάλεσμα για ενότητα, αξιοπρέπεια και ελπίδα. Ήταν χαρισματικός, με βλέμμα που λαμπύριζε από το πάθος των ανεκπλήρωτων ονείρων, και πολιτικό λόγο που είχε τον παθιασμένο ρυθμό των γκόσπελς της Mahalia Jackson, των θρησκευτικών τραγουδιών των αφροαμερικανών του Νότου.

Παρά τις αρετές του, όμως, μπορούσε να είναι ματαιόδοξος, φλύαρος και επιρρεπής σε υπερβολές.Τρεις μόλις εβδομάδες μετά την έναρξη της πρώτης εκστρατείας του, σε ανεπίσημη συζήτηση με δημοσιογράφους, χρησιμοποίησε προσβλητικούς όρους για τον εβραϊκό πληθυσμό της Νέας Υόρκης. Οι δηλώσεις αυτές προκάλεσαν σάλο που τον ακολούθησε για χρόνια. Όταν δολοφονήθηκε ο King, στο Μέμφις το 1968, άφησε να εννοηθεί ότι ήταν ο τελευταίος που του μίλησε και ότι κρατούσε το κεφάλι του ενώ ξεψυχούσε. Άλλοι παρόντες είπαν ότι αυτό δεν συνέβη ποτέ.

Ο Jackson γεννήθηκε ως Jesse Burns, νόθο παιδί του πυγμάχου Noah Robinson και της Helen Burns στο Greenville της Νότιας Καρολίνας. Δύο χρόνια αργότερα, η μητέρα του παντρεύτηκε τον Charles Jackson, και ο Jesse πήρε το επώνυμό του όταν ήταν 15 ετών.  Έζησε δύσκολα παιδικά χρόνια βιώνοντας την απόρριψη του βιολογικού του πατέρα. Ο νόθος γιός του πυγμάχου από το Greenville της Νότιας Καρολίνας, έπρεπε να σπάσει τα δεσμά όχι μόνο των φυλετικών διακρίσεων αλλά και της κοινωνικής ανυποληψίας, τη ρετσινιά του νόθου. Θυμόταν πάντοτε τις δύο βρύσες νερού στο αρτοποιείο όπου εργαζόταν τα Σάββατα το πρωί, μια για τους λευκούς και μια για τους μαύρους, και την πρώτη φορά που η μητέρα του τον οδήγησε στο πίσω μέρος του λεωφορείου που επιτρεπόταν να κάθονται οι Αφροαμερικανοί.

Το 1965 μετείχε στην πορεία για τα δικαιώματα ψήφου των Αφροαμερικανών στη Selma της Αλαμπάμα. Παρά την ψήφιση του Civil Rights Act το 1964 από την κυβέρνηση του Lyndon Johnson, οι πολιτείες του Νότου αρνούνταν να παραχωρήσουν εκλογικά δικαιώματα στους Αφροαμερικανούς. Οι Αφροαμερικανοί οργάνωσαν πορείες από τη Selma στο Montgomery της Alabama, αλλά αντιμετωπίστηκαν με βίαιη καταστολή, με αποκορύφωμα την Ματωμένη Κυριακή (Bloody Sunday) στις 7 Μαρτίου του 1965. Ο καρπός αυτών των κινητοποιήσεων, που είχαν ως επικεφαλής τον Martin Luther King, τον John Lewis  και άλλους, ήταν η ψήφιση του Voting Rights Act, στις 6 Αυγούστου του 1965, του νόμου που απαγόρευσε τις φυλετικές διακρίσεις στην άσκηση του εκλογικού δικαιώματος.  Ο Jackson εντυπωσίασε τον King, ο οποίος του προσέφερε θέση στο Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), έναν από τους βασικούς φορείς του κινήματος για τα πολιτικά δικαιώματα.

Το 1984 αποφάσισε ότι είχε έρθει η ώρα να διεκδικήσει ο ίδιος την προεδρία. Ίδρυσε τον Εθνικό Συνασπισμό Ουράνιου Τόξου (National Rainbow Coalition) ως όχημα μιας εκστρατείας από τη βάση. Στις προκριματικές εκλογές τερμάτισε τρίτος πίσω από τον γερουσιαστή Gary Hart και τον πρώην αντιπρόεδρο Walter Mondale, ο οποίος έλαβε τελικά το χρίσμα. Η ομιλία του στο συνέδριο των Δημοκρατικών στο Σαν Φρανσίσκο αποτέλεσε ίσως τη συναισθηματική κορύφωση της προεκλογικής εκστρατείας του κόμματος απέναντι στον Ronald Reagan. «Η εκλογική μου βάση είναι οι απελπισμένοι, οι καταραμένοι, οι αποκληρωμένοι, οι απαξιωμένοι και οι περιφρονημένοι. Είναι ανήσυχοι και αναζητούν απελευθέρωση” δήλωνε ο Jackson από το βήμα του Συνεδρίου.  Ήταν, όμως, η εποχή του Reagan και της Thatcher, η εποχή του επελαύνοντος οικονομικού νεοφιλελευθερισμού.

Δοκίμασε ξανά το 1988, αυτή τη φορά ως ισχυρός πλέον παράγοντας του Δημοκρατικού κόμματος. Στη «Σούπερ Τρίτη» του Μαρτίου κατέλαβε την πρώτη ή δεύτερη θέση στις περισσότερες πολιτείες. Τελικά το χρίσμα έλαβε ο κυβερνήτης της Μασαχουσέτης Μάικλ Δουκάκης. Στο συνέδριο του κόμματος στην Ατλάντα κάλεσε τους Δημοκρατικούς να στοιχηθούν πίσω από την πολυφυλετική και πολυπολιτισμική  Συμμαχία του Ουράνιου τόξου. «Όταν φτιάξουμε ένα μεγάλο πάπλωμα ενότητας, θα έχουμε τη δύναμη να φέρουμε υγειονομική περίθαλψη, στέγη, εργασία, εκπαίδευση και ελπίδα στο έθνος μας. Εμείς, ο λαός, μπορούμε να νικήσουμε. Να κρατήσουμε την ελπίδα ζωντανή.»

Ο Jesse Jackson μπορεί να μην κέρδισε το χρίσμα αλλά πέτυχε την ενεργοποίηση των μαύρων ψηφοφόρων και τη μετατόπιση του Δημοκρατικού κόμματος προς κοινωνικά προοδευτικότερες θέσεις. Το Rainbow Coalition ήταν το κάλεσμα για τη δημιουργία ενός πολιτικού κινήματος από τις περιθωριοποιημένες ομάδες, Αφροαμερικανούς, Λατίνους, Ινδιάνους, Λοάτκι, στη βάση της ταυτότητας. Η ιδέα του για έναν πολυφυλετικό και πολυπολιτισμικό συνασπισμό, ενδυναμωμένο από μια παρεμβατική κυβέρνηση για την αντιμετώπιση των ανισοτήτων στην αμερικανική ζωή, παρέμεινε κεντρική στην προοδευτική πτέρυγα του Δημοκρατικού Κόμματος. Ήταν ο πρόδρομος του woke culture του Δημοκρατικού κόμματος στα χρόνια που ακολούθησαν και ενέπνευσε τα κινήματα όπως το Black Lives Matter.

Σε αντίθεση με έναν άλλο Αφροααμερικανό ηγέτη, τον Malcolm X, ο Jackson δεν αμφισβήτησε ποτέ το αμερικανικό σύστημα. Επιδίωξε, αντίθετα, την πολιτική ενσωμάτωση των Αφροαμερικανών και, ως ένα βαθμό, κατάφερε να μεταφράσει τα αιτήματα τους σε εκλογική δύναμη και θεσμική επιρροή. Ενώ η δολοφονία και ο πρόωρος θάνατος των  Martin Luther King και του Malcolm X τους έδωσε μυθική διάσταση, ο Jackson έζησε αρκετά ώστε να μην αποφύγει τη φθορά του πολιτικού χρόνου.  

Flight 93, the Donroe Doctrine, and Gunboat Diplomacy

Flight 93, the Donroe Doctrine, and Gunboat Diplomacy

https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog, 15 January 2026.

In 2016, before the US presidential election that brought Trump’s first term, Michael Anton, a conservative thinker and senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, published an article under the alias Publius Decius Mus, titled “Flight 93 Election.” Michael Anton’s article played a crucial role in convincing conservatives of the new American right, as well as the broader conservative establishment, to abandon their reservations and rally around Trump’s candidacy. 

Anton’s argument to conservatives was that Trump may not have been the ideal candidate for the conservative counter-revolution, but he was aligned with their key priorities. He advocated economic nationalism, secure borders, and a foreign policy that prioritised America. Anton urged America’s serious conservative intellectuals to engage in political activism using an emotionally charged metaphor. He urged conservatives to charge the cockpit of the “American aircraft” together with Trump, just as the passengers of the ill-fated Flight 93 did on September 11, to take control and dismantle the ideological hegemony of the liberal left. “If he fails, they may not deserve the fate that will befall them, but they will suffer it regardless”. But if he succeeds, we will have a “second American Revolution that restores Constitutionalism, and limited government…”

The US National Security Strategy, published by the Trump administration in early December, exceeded the expectations of the new American right. It was a revolutionary document that completely overturned the post-war “rules-based” international order established by America, which was abided, in its basic tenets, by Democratic and Republican administrations until Trump. This text revived nationalism in the face of globalisation and economic mercantilism, declared war on immigration, and signalled America’s isolation in the Western hemisphere. 

Maduro’s abduction and his transfer to American justice had all the ingredients of the new US Security Strategy. This was a unilateral action taken without convening the United Nations Security Council and without consulting either the Organization of American States or even America’s allies. It signaled the return to the realpolitik of the 19th century, gunboat diplomacy, spheres of influence, and a world where might is right. In domestic politics, the complete disregard for Congressional oversight of an act of war demonstrated the erosion of institutional checks and balances and the complete dominance of the executive branch. In other words, a drift to what Arthur Schlesinger identified as the excessive growth of presidential power beyond constitutional limits, the “Imperial Presidency”. 

The dictator’s removal from power was not done to restore democracy. Trump’s statements showed that the form of the regime is not as important as its obedience to the Trump administration. Furthermore, Maduro’s removal was not only about combating drugs or grabbing Venezuela’s oil. It was a policy designed to assert American hegemony throughout the region. Hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, the Donroe Doctrine, as Trump himself called it, is the Monroe Doctrine with the addition of the “Roosevelt Corollary”, in an extreme Trumpian version.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was a defensive policy by a newly formed state seeking to protect its interests in the wider region from the European colonial powers. In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt transformed the Monroe Doctrine into a doctrine of interventionism. Under the “Roosevelt Corollary”, the United States could intervene militarily in the Western Hemisphere to restore order and protect its interests. From a policy designed to exclude European powers from the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine became the vehicle for American interventionism in Latin America. In its Trumpian version, the “Donroe Doctrine”, America proclaims that it will act unhinged in its hemisphere, from immigration and the war on drugs to the management of natural resources, regime change, renaming geographical sites, and even the annexation of territories. 

America’s policies in its hemisphere revive imperialist and neo-colonial practices and divide the international chessboard into spheres of influence among the US, Russia, and China. If Venezuela, and tomorrow Greenland, are Trump’s Georgia and Ukraine, Taiwan could later be Xi’s Venezuela, and Moldova could be Putin’s Greenland. 

The insistence of the Trump administration on its claims on Greenland, in particular, will test the already strained Euro-American relations and will undermine the solidarity of NATO. 

European-American relations have already been tested on a number of issues from tariffs, to defense expenditures in NATO, the “burden sharing” issue, and support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the Trump administration has missed no opportunity to show its contempt for the European Union, whether in the form of Vance’s admonitions, the support of like-minded right-wing political forces in Europe, or the condescending view of Europe in the US National Security Strategy. Trump’s aversion to institutions, norms and procedures has amounted to a frontal attack on the very existence of the European Union. European leadership has responded by appeasing and cajoling Trump in an effort to salvage the Transatlantic Alliance. But sooner or later, it will have to face harsh realities. Europe was the cornerstone of the rules-based post-war international order, which the Trump administration has chosen to upend. The Trump administration is keen to a rapprochement with Russia even at the expense of its European Allies. Europe cannot depend on the American security guarantee anymore. We have returned to an international order of great power antagonism. That means that if a European version of De Gaulle’s “all-azimouth” strategy might be “a bridge too far”, certainly, European strategic autonomy has been long overdue. In Europe, we need to realise that Trump’s foreign policy is revolutionary, and the new Security Strategy and the “Donroe doctrine” have unleashed forces that threaten to bring about a domino of uncontrollable geopolitical developments.

The state of American democracy after Trump

The state of American democracy after Trump

Abstract
Democracy is retreating worldwide. As Freedom House reports, the US has not escaped this trend. The system of checks and balances of American democracy managed to thwart Trump’s assault on democracy. But together with longstanding institutional and structural defects, his
presidency clearly indicates that American democracy is on the verge of political decay. Political polarisation, inequalities, identity politics and the inability of the two political parties to reach compromises are further testing the American democratic institutions. To avert decay, the US
needs a reform coalition to bring about institutional changes; and more importantly, to establish inclusive economic policies and a renewed focus on citizenship, duty and a shared purpose.

Keywords
Democracy, Checks and balances, Vote suppression, Polarisation, Inequalities, Identity politics.

Introduction
Democracy is retreating worldwide. Freedom House reports that the number of democracies is shrinking and that democracy is declining in the US itself (Freedom House 2019). The same report maintains that the great challenges facing American democracy started before Donald Trump’s presidency. ‘Intensifying polarization, declining economic mobility, the outsized influence of special interests, and the diminished influence of fact-based reporting in favor of bellicose partisan media’ were some of the problems already facing American democracy before Trump (2019, 17).

The US is in the midst of a political and constitutional crisis that could seriously threaten its democracy over the next years. The storming of Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021 was an assault on democracy that continues unabated. The hope that Trump would fade away after the January 2021 insurrection and his subsequent electoral defeat has proved futile. Trump’s shadow lingers over the political system and the Republican Party. He has built a movement around a cult of personality that allows him to maintain high rates of popularity and support among his followers.

Under Trump’s ‘hostile takeover’ of the Republican Party, as Jared Kushner phrased it (cited in Diamond 2020), all kinds of tactics are being used to bend the rules to the party’s advantage, including suppressing the vote. State legislatures are enacting legislation
that amounts to vote suppression, while giving themselves greater control of the election certification process (Kagan 2021). More than 100 leading scholars of democracy have signed a Statement of Concern warning about grave threats to American democracy stemming from the efforts to suppress voting (Norris 2021).

This article argues that American democracy is being threatened with political decay by the lasting effects of Trump’s presidency together with longstanding institutional defects, as well as extreme polarisation, widening inequalities and identity politics. For this decay to be averted, there is urgent need of enlightened leadership and a broad reform coalition to bring about institutional changes; inclusive economic policies; and a renewed focus on citizenship, duty and shared purpose.

The effects of Trump’s presidency on American democracy
Aristotle warned that demagogues who could capture the minds of the people posed a real threat to democracy. Aware of these risks, ‘the framers of the Constitution instituted a system of checks and balances. The point was not simply to ensure that no one branch of the government dominated the others but also to anchor in institutions different points of view’ (Snyder 2021). They designed a system ‘to protect minority points of view, to protect us from leaders inclined to lie, cheat and steal, and to protect the majority against minorities who are determined to subvert the constitutional order’ (Galston and Kamarck 2022).

Proving resilient at both the federal and state levels, these checks and balances managed to thwart the Trumpian assault on democracy. Congress held its own, confronting the president with impeachment charges not once but twice. The judiciary remained independent and resisted his attempts to overturn the election results. A total of 62 lawsuits that Trump’s legal team filed were either dropped or unsuccessful in court. Many of these decisions were made by Republican judges. The former president’s biggest disappointment may have been ‘the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear election challenges concerning states he claimed he had won’ (Galston and Kamarck 2022).

The states also resisted Trump’s federal actions or decisions, especially regarding the pandemic. And the military upheld the long democratic tradition of civil–military relations in the US whereby the armed forces, under civilian control, stay out of politics. Finally, the press remained fundamentally free even though Trump ‘spent four years using the bully pulpit of the presidency to mock the press. He revoked the press credentials of reporters he did not like. Nevertheless, reporters were not afraid to call out his lies’ (Galston and Kamarck 2022). However, the discrediting of the traditional media—together with the decline of local news, which was a result of the financial crisis of 2008—and Trump’s skilful use of social media, especially Twitter, led to distortion of the truth and reality during his presidency. In a functional representative democracy, the social media cannot be citizens’ only source of information. Social media ‘supercharge the mental habits by which we seek emotional stimulation and comfort, which means losing the distinction between what feels true and what actually is true’ (Snyder 2021).

The checks and balances of the American political system withstood the Trump presidency’s frontal assault on the democratic institutions, norms, conventions and traditions of the US. However, his presidency polarised this system to the extreme and exacerbated weaknesses in its institutions. His constant attack on the truth, culminating in the ‘Big Lie’ of the rigged election, has misinformed and disoriented US citizens and has sapped the foundations of American democracy. ‘There is no guarantee that constitutional democracy will survive another sustained—and likely better-organized—assault in the years to come’ (Galston and Kamarck 2022).

Institutional factors
The deterioration of democracy started even before Trump, it being the result of ‘the persistent gridlock in US Congress, deepening political polarisation and the corrupting role of dark money in politics. It accelerated during the last four years, with attacks on the news media, risks to the impartiality of the courts, and the weakening role of Congress as an effective check and balance on executive powers’ (Norris 2021). Moreover, the assortment of deep structural problems and sweeping historical changes that are taking place simultaneously make this an existential crisis for American democracy.

The aftermath of the 2020 presidential election highlighted the problems of the ‘unique combination of a majoritarian electoral system with strong minoritarian institutions’ (McCoy and Press 2022). The Senate, for example, is highly disproportionate in its representation, with ‘two senators per state regardless of their population, from Wyoming’s 580,000 to California’s 39,500,000’ (McCoy and Press 2022). This disproportionality becomes particularly problematic when it comes to the electoral college. ‘All but two states give the winner of the popular vote in their state all of the electors from that state’ (Lessig 2021). This disproportionality has resulted in elections being focused on the so-called swing states. These states provide sufficient electoral college votes to win the election regardless of the outcome in the popular vote.

This, in effect, is how Trump won in 2016, despite his claim that he had won not only the electoral college but the popular vote as well. His argument was that Hillary Clinton had won the popular vote because millions of people had voted illegally (O’Toole 2020). After the 2020 election Trump actively tried to overturn the will of the people. When that failed, the assault on the electoral process took a more organised form. ‘Republican majorities in state legislatures are passing laws making it harder to vote and weakening the ability of election officials to do their jobs. Trump’s supporters are also trying to defeat incumbents who upheld the integrity of the election and replace them with the
former President’s supporters’ (Galston and Kamarck 2022).

If you add to these efforts the traditional gerrymandering, you have a new organised attack against American democracy from the ground up. Partisan gerrymandering has resulted in a radical manipulation of legislative districts. A study by the USC Schwarzenegger Institute found that after the 2018 election the result of gerrymandering was that almost 60 million Americans live under minority rule in their state legislatures.

Polarisation
The destructive power of polarisation in American politics makes things even worse. A recent Carnegie Endowment article argues that ‘the United States is the only advanced Western democracy to have faced such intense polarization for such an extended period’ (McCoy and Press 2020). According to the authors one of the reasons for this intense polarisation is the so-called white backlash, the reaction of the white population to a demographic shift that threatens their dominant position in all arenas of power. Polarisation goes beyond politics to the basis of the social pyramid, affecting even consumer interests and lifestyle preferences (Ruch et al. 2020). The result is a polarised political system and an increasingly polarised society.

There has been a fundamental change in the ideological nature of the two major parties in the US, and this has contributed to the intensity of the country’s political polarisation. The two parties have been transformed from large associations encompassing wide ideological trends to ideologically homogeneous parties. In recent years partisan identities have gradually merged ‘with our racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities’ (Klein 2020). These merged identities make the two-party system highly polarised and rigid and have ‘attain[ed] a weight that is breaking our institutions and tearing all the bonds that hold this country together’ (Klein 2020).

Democratic institutions rest on norms, as well as ‘on compromise, cooperation, respect for truth and are bolstered by an active, self-confident citizenry and a free press. When democratic values come under attack and the press and civil society are neutralized, the institutional safeguards lose their power. The gradual erosion of checks and balances thus gives way to sudden institutional collapse’ (Acemoglu 2020). The Trump
presidency not only assaulted democratic institutions; perhaps equally importantly, ‘he destroyed many Americans’ trust in their institutions’ (Acemoglu 2020).

The growing polarisation, distrust, intolerance, the intertwining of partisan affiliations with racial, ethnic, or religious identities, and the inability to forge political compromises across partisan divides’ are all signs of political decay (Diamond 2020). The term ‘political decay’ was first used by Huntington in his seminal 1968 work Political Order in Changing Societies to explain the instability in many developing countries after the Second World War. His argument was that ‘socioeconomic modernization caused problems for traditional political orders, leading to the mobilization of new social groups whose participation could not be accommodated by existing political institutions. Political decay was caused by the inability of institutions to adapt to changing circumstances’ (Fukuyama 2014).

Fukuyama has used Huntington’s term ‘political decay’ to account for the causes of political dysfunction in the US today. The political system is decaying, he argues, because its traditional system of checks and balances has become rigid: ‘In an environment of sharp political polarization, this decentralized system is less and less able to represent majority interests and gives excessive representation to the views of interest groups and activist organizations that collectively do not add up to a sovereign American people.’ Fukuyama is rather pessimistic about the prospect of political reform, predicting that political decay in America will continue ‘until some external shock comes along to catalyze a true reform coalition and galvanize it to action’ (Fukuyama 2014).

Inequalities
That parts of the American public place less trust in the country’s institutions is also due to the increasing inequalities that have obfuscated the American dream. In recent decades inequalities have grown exponentially in the US. In a 2014 article, Nick Hanauer writes, ‘During the past three decades, compensation for CEOs grew 127 times faster than it did for workers. Since 1950, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio has increased 1,000 percent . . . CEOs used to earn 30 times the median wage; now they rake in 500 times’ (Hanauer 2014).

Globalisation brought about trade and development but in a very uneven way. For example, increased trade with China and other low-wage countries accelerated the decline in manufacturing employment in the developed world, leaving many economically depressed communities behind. Manufacturing communities in the US saw their jobs shipped off to China and Mexico and experienced rising rates of unemployment at home.

One of the major effects of the post-1990 wave of globalisation in the US is the decoupling of corporations from local communities. Companies and corporations have always been social units as well as economic entities. Corporations were first created in medieval Europe as an independent vehicle to achieve economic progress but also to create prosperity for society or to build institutions for the public good, such as hospitals and universities (Schwab 2020).

However, corporations gradually abandoned this vision and embraced that of Milton Friedman. For the University of Chicago economist, ‘There is one and only one social responsibility of business. To use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits’ (cited in Schwab 2020). In short, the business of business is strictly business. The result of the transition was that ‘wages in the United States started to stagnate. Union power declined. The natural environment deteriorated as the economy improved. Governments found it difficult to gather taxes from multinational corporations.

In the four decades since 1980, economic inequality of all forms has significantly increased’ (Schwab 2020). The economy looks like a bottleneck with the rich in the neck, the poor in the bottle and no wealth going through. Furthermore, the US has veered away from the post-war spirit of social responsibility and public service, expressed by Kennedy’s ‘Ask what you can do for your country’, to the ‘Greed is good’ ethos of personal and corporate wealth aggrandisement. Eventually ‘the market became everything, public service was devalued, and taxes were for suckers’ (Walt 2020).

Inequalities were also exacerbated by the fourth industrial technological revolution. Technological changes created a new social stratification between technologically literate and technologically illiterate citizens and workers. Workers were being left behind, either because automation was leading them to unemployment or because they did not have the means to acquire the new skills essential to re-enter the workforce.
This was not the only impact of technology on American democracy, however. The growth of gigantic Internet platforms that wielded so much control over political communication posed a big challenge. ‘These behemoths now dominate the dissemination of information and the coordination of political mobilization . . . No liberal democracy is content to entrust concentrated power to individuals based on assumptions about their good intentions’ (Fukuyama et al. 2021).

Globalisation intensified inequalities, but the information available gave people immediate knowledge of those disparities. Citizens could now have all the data at hand and could make comparisons, and that brought resentment.

Identity politics
During the twentieth century political competition in the US was mainly defined by economic issues. The Democratic Party was largely associated with policies that favoured increased government spending, a larger welfare state and regulations on business. The Republican Party, in turn, was associated with policies that favoured limited government, fewer safety nets and more laissez-faire policies. In the twentyfirst century political competition appears to centre around the issue of identity.

Political struggles do not revolve solely around economic conflict anymore, but around the resentment of groups in society that believe their dignity has been affronted and their rights have been violated. The left shifted its emphasis from the ‘conditions of the working class to the often psychological demands of an ever-widening circle of marginalized groups’ (Fukuyama 2018). According to Fukuyama, the Hegelian struggle for
recognition, as the ultimate driver of human history, is the essence of identity politics— and it is this that drives a large part of the political struggles today.

McCoy and Press argue that one of the reasons that the US is so polarised is ‘the durability of identity politics in a racially and ethnically diverse democracy’ (2022). As the Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements have shown, identity politics was a natural and inevitable response to injustice. More importantly, these movements have brought about a social awakening, and changes in public policy and cultural norms in the direction of greater socioeconomic equality.

However, the right used identity politics to focus on, and subsequently to mobilise, other groups of society that fall outside of the cultural scope of the new left. These groups include working-class people that have become impoverished or have been left behind because of the negative effects of globalisation or automation and the forces of the technological revolution, and farmers and farm households that have low income and low wealth. Among a significant segment of white American society that has been dragged into the underclass and feels threatened
by other social groups, there has been a negative reaction, the white backlash. Thus, a new political competition has emerged alongside cultural and identity politics.

A side effect of this identity politics is the issue of political correctness, which has also mobilised the right. Trump’s rhetoric and behaviour would have ended the career of any politician in the past. For many of his supporters, Trump may be ‘mendacious, malicious, bigoted, and unpresidential, but at least he says what he thinks’ (Fukuyama 2018, 119). By attacking political correctness head on, Trump ‘was moving the focus of identity politics from the left, where it was born, to the right, where it is now taking root’ (Fukuyama 2018, 119). The identity politics of the right includes ethnicity; the Christian religion; rural residence; and belief in traditional family values. Trump dangerously included race. In fact, he ‘was careful not to articulate overly racist views. But he has happily accepted support from individuals and groups that hold them. Since his rise, white nationalism has moved from a fringe movement to something much more mainstream in American politics’ (Fukuyama 2018, 120).

Identity politics was embraced by both the Democrats and the Republicans in a way that, far from helping to overcome urban–rural, religious–secular and racial–ethnic cleavages, actually exacerbated them (Edsall 2022). In an article that has been highly criticised by the left, Mark Lilla (2016) wrote that ‘American liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender, and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying force capable of governing.’ In a book he wrote a year later, Lilla insisted that Trump’s accession to the White House was a backlash against an obsession with identity politics on the part of the American
left: ‘We need no more marchers. We need more mayors’ (Lilla 2017, 37).

Be that as it may, it is clear that identity politics has contributed to the polarisation of the political system. The Republican Party has moved to more conservative and extremist views, as represented by its Tea Party wing, while the Democratic Party has veered to
the left (Mann and Ornstein 2012).

Conclusion
Political polarisation, institutional factors, inequalities and identity politics are testing the constitutional stability of American democracy. Trump’s presidency weakened its institutions and traditions and assaulted the system’s checks and balances. Trump viciously attacked the separation of powers, the free press, the independent judiciary and the integrity of elections. He exacerbated existing weaknesses in the political system.
But more importantly he intensified political polarisation to such an extent that it is difficult to see how it could be reversed. Polarisation within the political system has trickled down to the electorate. In this way it has become self-perpetuating in that it places ideological
extremists in both parties at an advantage and leads to a situation where those running for office increasingly hold extreme views. According to McCoy and Press (2022), ‘only 16 of the 52 countries that reached levels of pernicious polarization succeeded in achieving depolarization.’

Polarisation is also fed by the ‘identity wars’ between the two parties. The remedy, perhaps, is not to abandon the idea of identity but to ‘define larger and more integrative national identities that take into account the de facto diversity of existing liberal democratic societies’ (Fukuyama 2018).

In 1941 Roosevelt made his Four Freedoms speech, which proposed four fundamental liberties that people everywhere in the world ought to enjoy: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. He also outlined the benefits of democracy, which included economic opportunity, employment, social security and the promise of adequate health care. In this way he outlined a common ‘national good’, and his New Deal policies extended economic prosperity to almost all Americans.

Today American democracy needs another New Deal. It needs enlightened leadership and a reform coalition that will bring about not only institutional changes but also, and more importantly, inclusive economic policies and a renewed focus on citizenship, duty and shared purpose. Otherwise, it is threatened with political decay.

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Transatlantic Relations After AUKUS

Transatlantic Relations After AUKUS

AUKUS was an agreement high on symbolism but low on substance.

It symbolised the continuity of the “Pivot to Asia” policy through three successive Presidencies, from Obama, to Trump, to Biden. In terms of strategic substance, however, it did not add much to existent collective security arrangements. The US and Australia were already formally bound together, along with New Zealand in a tripartite collective defense agreement (ANZUS). The signatories of AUKUS are also members of other security arrangements, such as the “Five Eyes” agreement on sharing intelligence, that includes Canada and New Zealand.

Furthermore, AUKUS is not an alliance in the strict sense of the term, in that it does not include a collective defence commitment like NATO’s Article 5does. Accordingly, it does not provide for automatic collective action in the event, let us say, of a Chinese provocation in Taiwan. All this may have amounted, in strategic terms, to a storm in a teacup, if the Biden administration had not infuriated the French and annoyed the Europeans with the way it handled the whole issue.

The French were infuriated because the largest arms export deal in French history (roughly 56 billion euros) was “stolen” from them, and to add insult to injury to Macron, it happened less than a year from the French elections. The deal was struck in secrecy, with the Americans and the Australians failing to inform the French that they were involved in parallel negotiations. This is not supposed to happen among allies and friends, and the French struck back accusing the parties involved of lies, duplicity, and a major breach of trust. The agreement was also a real blow to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, meticulously developed over the last several years, along the Paris-New Delhi-Canberra axis.

Finally, there was the ghost of Nassau. The French felt, once again in their history, slighted by the Anglo-Saxons. In December 1962, it was the Kennedy administration that tried to appease the Macmillan government over the cancellation of the Skybolt missile project that was supposed to provide the basis of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrence. In order to appease the British, the Kennedy administration conceded to provide them with the Polaris missiles that represented a much more technologically advanced missile system. De Gaulle became outraged over the special treatment of the British by the Americans and the fact that a similar deal wasn’t extended to the French. He castigated this “Anglo-Saxon collusion” and, months later, blocked Britain’s entry into the EEC. It would be the beginning of de Gaulle’s independent foreign policy. The force de frappe, the “all azimuth strategy”, and the eventual French withdrawal from NATO’s military structure would become de Gaulle’s heretical actions within the Western camp during the apex of the Cold War.

The AUKUS agreement felt like déjà vu to the French political elite. It was no accident that the French opposition revived the Gaullist rhetoric, while the official French communiqué talked about “the need to raise loud and clear the issue of European strategic autonomy”.
If the French felt betrayed by AUKUS, the Europeans felt that the honeymoon between the European Union and the Biden administration came to an abrupt end. First, it was America’s hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan that did not give the Europeans enough time to withdraw their own people. Second, it was the troubling aspect of AUKUS that included Britain at the expense of a European member state, giving Brexiters the pretext to boast that they have delivered on their promises on a post-Brexit “Global Britain”.

AUKUS reminded Europeans that Europe’s geopolitical significance to American policymakers has declined after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. More importantly, it was a sad reminder that Europe is not viewed by the US as a global power with whom America needs to deepen cooperation to face common challenges.

Suddenly, Europeans realised that Trump might be gone, but his policies remain, and Biden’s comforting words on the value of transatlantic ties did not amount to much more than words. It is no coincidence that besides the offended French, the Germans, the staunchest transatlanticists of the continent, argued that AUKUS “ought to be a wake-up call for all Europeans”.

No one in Europe would argue against America’s urgent priority to focus on China’s rise and the need to deal with the challenges of China’s global agenda. The “Pivot to Asia”, however, together with the American withdrawal from other regions, send the wrong signals to other revisionist authoritarian powers such as Russia. They signal that America is receding from its role as a global hegemon, abdicating its global responsibilities. Furthermore, while America may be pivoting to Asia, China is pivoting everywhere, as its globally ambitious “Belt and Road” strategy suggests. Whereas China is emerging as a global power, America is perceived to be posturing as a regional Pacific power.

The United States needs to address the rising Chinese challenge across the globe and in every relevant policy area. In this effort, “Pivoting to Asia” will not suffice. To effectively meet the Chinese challenge, America will need to resume its global reach. Doing so will require the cooperation of the European Union, and the unity of the Transatlantic Alliance. A united West “Pivoting to Eurasia” is a much more geopolitically sensible strategy to effectively counter China’s growing challenge.

Transatlantic relations after the COVID-19 pandemic

Transatlantic relations after the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract
This article analyses how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the relationship between Europe and the US, and provides suggestions on how transatlantic cooperation should be taken forward. The pandemic has increased public distrust of the US in Europe due to the way the former has chosen to respond to COVID-19. However, this article argues that the pandemic has mainly accelerated existing transatlantic differences rather than creating new ones. To restore the transatlantic relationship, Europe and the US should strengthen their cooperation on common challenges such as climate change, health security, China, terrorism and migration. COVID-19 has highlighted the limitations of nationalist and unilateral policies in confronting global challenges. It may, in the end, provide the impetus for a rejuvenated transatlantic partnership and build a renewed sense of transatlantic solidarity.

Keywords
EU, US, Transatlantic relationship, COVID-19, China, International relations

Introduction
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has not outright caused changes in international relations. Rather, it has reinforced and accelerated fundamental characteristics of the international system that had already appeared before the crisis (Haass 2020a, 2). The same holds true for its effect on transatlantic relations.

The reputation of the US has declined sharply over the past year, even among its key allies and partners. For example, just 41% of the public in the UK express a favourable opinion of the US. In France, only 31% see the US positively, and in Germany only 26% (Wike et al. 2020). Never in the history of Pew polling has the US ranked this low. This decline has been the result of its handling of the pandemic and of concerns about racial injustice following the 25 May killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, which led to massive protests in major cities of the US. Views of the administration of President Donald J. Trump have also deteriorated further, with a median of only 16% expressing confidence in him in the 13 countries surveyed (Wike et al. 2020).

Attitudes and public opinion aside, the pandemic is the latest in a series of mutual grievances between the two sides of the Atlantic over defence spending, trade, lack of consultation and much more. National responses to the pandemic brought about more grievances and tension.

In the face of medical supply shortages, both the United States and Europe turned inward. Washington ordered the 3M company to halt its export of N95 masks and to reroute its overseas production to the United States as part of a broader effort to meet domestic demand. The
European Union banned the export of face shields, gloves, masks, and protective garments for the same reason. (Donfried and Ischinger 2020, 1)

This transatlantic disarray opened a window of opportunity that Russia and China rushed to exploit. China, in particular, saw a chance to improve its image, which had been tarnished by its disastrous initial reaction of denial and cover up that had helped to spread the disease. It engaged in a massive public relations campaign, sending medical staff, gloves and masks to many European countries.

This article argues that, although COVID-19 has affected the transatlantic relationship negatively, US and European positions on several major issues had been diverging even before the pandemic. These include policy disagreements over Iraq, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Paris Climate Agreement, the nuclear deal with Iran, tariffs, digital taxation and the relocation of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem (Brattberg and Whineray 2020, 2). Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the World Health Organization in the midst of a pandemic, and his refusal to join an international vaccine effort involving more than 170 nations has made things even worse. To restore the transatlantic relationship, Europe and the US should strengthen their cooperation on common challenges such as climate change, health security, China, terrorism and migration. Given that COVID-19 has highlighted the limitations of nationalist and unilateral policies in confronting global challenges, it may, in the end, provide the impetus for a rejuvenated transatlantic partnership and build a renewed sense of transatlantic solidarity.

The rest of the article is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief overview of transatlantic relations under the Trump administration. The second looks at how the transatlantic alliance oscillates between ‘strategic dependence’ and a future of ‘strategic autonomy’, even though the most sensible and mutually beneficial posture would be ‘strategic complementarity’. The third looks at the increasing strategic significance of China, and how US and European policies towards Beijing shape the transatlantic relationship. The fourth and final section concludes the article.

Transatlantic relations under Trump
The Trump administration has widened the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic. Trump’s offensive and divisive rhetoric has alienated Europeans. His comments on the EU being a ‘foe’ or ‘competitor’, Germany being ‘very bad’ and a ‘captive of Russia’, NATO being ‘obsolete’ and so many others have insulted European leaders and offended European public opinion. He is perceived as impulsive and unpredictable, making unilateral decisions such as the withdrawal of US forces from Syria or Germany without prior consultation with European Allies (Brattberg and Whineray 2020).

Europeans loathe Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy with its emphasis on making gains in short-term deals rather than in managing long-term relationships. They have a hard time understanding his antagonising of America’s allies and dismantling of international institutions that were built under the leadership of the US and, for the most part, have served American interests well. His rhetoric and policies have sapped confidence in his leadership in general and his commitment to the transatlantic partnership in particular (Arvanitopoulos 2019).

His handling of the pandemic has further eroded trust in his leadership. The belief in Europe that the ‘adults in the room’, that is, the seasoned professionals that occupy key positions in the administration, would temper his erratic behaviour came crumbling down with the pandemic. Trump has shown total disrespect for science and scientists in his handling of the pandemic and thus has exacerbated the crisis.

Finally, the pandemic has highlighted the ‘spillover effect’ of Trumpism in Europe. Views of Trump are more positive among Europeans who have favourable views of right-wing populist parties. Consequently, positive ratings of America’s response to the pandemic are linked to support for right-wing populist parties and political ideology within several countries. ‘Those on the extreme right are more likely to think that the US has done a good job handling the outbreak’ (Wike et al. 2020).

The Trump Presidency and the evolution of American public opinion have created significant political uncertainty in Europe about the future of transatlantic relations. European policymakers are trying to understand and assess whether these recent developments reflect a permanent change and divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic or whether they represent temporary trends. Differences on policy issues, quarrels over ‘burden sharing’ and clashes in the personalities of the leaderships have often appeared along the trajectory of the transatlantic partnership. They have not, so far, managed to create a permanent and irreparable rift between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The US reaction to the pandemic, however, has reinforced the notion that the direction of the Trump administration reflects a structural change in US foreign policy and American public opinion. The first to express this concern was German Chancellor Angela Merkel with her statement on ‘taking our fate into our own hands’ during the first skirmishes with the Trump administration and Trump’s visit to Europe. Following Trump’s announcement of the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Merkel came back with a stronger statement: ‘it is not the case that the United States of America will simply protect us. Instead, Europe must take its destiny in its own hands. That is our job for the future’ (Merkel 2018).

And so the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ has become the focal point of European policy. EU member states have signed a new defence agreement for Permanent Structured Cooperation, a legally binding framework for the most willing and able member states to work on project-based joint capability development. In addition, they have established a joint European Defence Fund, for which the European Council proposed a €7.014 billion budget for 2021–7 in July. They have also created smaller EU Battlegroups to respond to and prevent crises (Nováky 2017).

Strategic complementarity
The asymmetry in power between Europe and the US, the notion of the ‘uneven barbell’ in the defence area, created a European dependence on the US for its security during the Cold War which continues to persist. American pre-eminence was conceded by the Europeans in return for American nuclear protection. Both sides of the Atlantic benefited from this arrangement. The EU could not have sustained its pan-European dream without the American security guarantee, and the US could not have maintained a strong global reach without a powerful and self-sufficient Europe. European free-riding in defence was allowed because a united Western Europe was considered vital in the overarching American Cold War strategy.

The eclipse of the Soviet threat after the collapse of the USSR and the rise of China have led the US to increasingly abdicate its responsibilities for Europe and ‘pivot to Asia’. Trump’s hostility to NATO and the EU has sent Europeans back to the drawing board. The European vision of ‘strategic autonomy’, on the other hand, has raised scepticism in the US. ‘US policymakers would prefer Europeans to spend more on military power within the confines of NATO, an idea that is based on the assumption that a more capable Europe would still follow the United States’ lead’ (Polyakova and Haddad 2020). It is unlikely, however, that Europe with a defence capability will blindly follow the US.

US policymakers face a dilemma: ‘do they prefer to maintain a weak and divided Europe that is aligned with their interests and dependent on US power? Or are they ready to deal with a more forceful and autonomous partner that will sometimes go against their favoured policies?’ (Polyakova and Haddad 2020). Aside from legitimate fears of unnecessary duplication with the NATO alliance, the Trump administration’s negative stance towards European defence cooperation is counterintuitive. Increased European spending on defence addresses the ‘burden sharing’ issue, and the strengthening of European forces benefits both NATO and the EU.

The strengthening of European defence should gently situate the transatlantic alliance, which oscillates between a condition of ‘strategic dependence’ and a future of ‘strategic autonomy’, in the sensible and mutually beneficial posture of ‘strategic complementarity’.
This outcome would be more easily facilitated by a new US administration. For many Europeans, Trump, with his ‘America first’ slogan and his antipathy towards the EU and NATO, has forfeited his ability to bring unity to the transatlantic partnership.

Pivot to Eurasia
There seems to be an additional reason for the growing psychological distancing between the US and Europe. Europeans are concerned that the eastern American establishment, which had traditionally been dominant in US policy formulation, is no longer in control. US foreign policy has shifted towards Asia, bringing to power people of political influence without a strong European orientation. This estrangement is not only due to high politics, but also to trends in demographics and public opinion. European immigration to the US is declining and, consequently, the role of Europeans in shaping the US political landscape is also declining (Ganesh 2020).

The lack of interest in Europe is a trend particularly evident in the falling interest in European studies at American universities. This declining interest in Europe has come about as a result of the fact that Europe is no longer the strategic theatre of geopolitics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, its succession by a declining Russia and the rise of China have moved the geopolitical pendulum to Asia.

China poses a serious challenge to American and Western interests. It is not only challenging American geopolitical interests in South-East Asia, but with its grand geopolitical design of the ‘One Belt One Road Initiative’, it is trying to alter the balance of power in the Eurasian landmass. It also poses a challenge to the global economic system and the Western liberal order (Arvanitopoulos 2019).

The US ‘pivot to Asia’ preceded the Trump administration. It was a policy created under the Obama–Biden administration and will certainly not be reversed by a Biden Presidency. The truth of the matter is that since George W. Bush all presidents have followed a policy of disengagement from Europe that has differed only in scope and style.

Concern with Asia is not a new element of US foreign policy. There has always been a strong tradition of US involvement in Asia, dating all the way back to Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt. In 1906 Roosevelt was the first American president to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his backchannel efforts to broker the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese war. The US, a continental nation reaching
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, has always kept one eye to the west, like the Roman god Janus. The shift to the Pacific is here to stay. The Quad, the new security forum formed of the US, Japan, Australia and India, is a response to the rising challenge of China. ‘The call of Asia is too loud in Washington’ (Ganesh 2020).

The US–China feud under the Trump administration has mainly been about trade issues. His withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was a result of his fixation on the idea that every transaction ought to be a zero-sum game, with a winner and a loser. Trump was eager to strike his own bilateral trade deal with China and sell it to his electorate in glowing terms. It was only after the COVID-19 pandemic hit the US that Trump’s rhetoric towards China became bellicose. Now that the ‘Chinese virus’ was threatening his presidency, the rhetoric of his administration shifted to pitting the ‘free world’ against a new ‘tyranny’. A Democratic administration is more likely to put values and human rights at the centre of its foreign policy towards China.

On the other hand, China’s increased economic and political footprint in Europe has led to growing concern among policymakers. The absence of a unified policy approach has given China increased leverage on a bilateral basis with EU member states. The size of Chinese investments has led some critics to suggest that Chinese money could replace Russian energy as a source of significant influence in Europe. In response to these concerns, the European Commission promoted, and the European Parliament adopted legislation requiring transparency and screening of Chinese investments, more controls over potential Chinese dumping, and more scrutiny of China’s offers to provide debt-based infrastructure financing and low-cost loans (Congressional Research Service 2019). In March 2019, the EU released a new EU–China Strategic Outlook, which stated that China is an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. This document requires all member states doing business with China to ensure compliance with EU law, rules and policies (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019).

Europe will not strictly follow the US lead when it comes to defining its relationship with China. As Macron put it, ‘we have the right not to be outright enemies with our friends’ enemies’ (Economist 2019). When Europeans were asked in a poll, which side, if any, their country should take in a US–China conflict, their overwhelming answer was neither (Ganesh 2020). At the same time, there is a security concern in Europe with
respect to its technology base and its 5G networks. China’s role in connecting billions of sensitive information and communication technology systems in crucial sectors has become a concern not only in the US but in Europe as well.

If security concerns in Europe and the US are one aspect of a common approach regarding China, the other is the issue of values and democracy. It is the alternative political model that China presents, and more importantly, the revenue it offers to struggling governments that give weak democracies the capacity to pull away from the West. This dynamic is most apparent in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where China has made major infrastructure investments (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman 2018). This became particularly evident during the pandemic crisis, when China engaged in a massive public relations campaign by airlifting medical equipment to win the hearts and minds of the citizens of these states.

The defence of the Western ideals of democracy, freedom and human rights; a free market economy; and the security of the West are better served by a common approach and a strong transatlantic partnership. The US may be pivoting to Asia, but China has been pivoting to Europe through a series of bilateral agreements with member states and heavy investments. The Belt and Road Initiative exceeds regional ambitions and is indicative of China’s global aspirations. America’s ‘pivot to Asia’ is a regional response to a global challenge that defies the geopolitical concept of Eurasia as an undivided space. To meet the challenge of China, the two pillars of the West, the US and Europe, need to form a unified response across Eurasia.

Conclusion
Since 1985, the world has faced a number of pandemic crises, from Aids, SARS and Ebola, to H1N1 and COVID-19. Despite the nationalisation of the immediate response to the current crisis, citizens and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly realise that an effective response to the problem requires more, rather than less, cooperation. Europe and the US need to work together to tackle this and future pandemics. This cooperation must be based ‘on an agreed transatlantic pandemic strategy that defines what constitutes a pandemic, explains protocols for early containment and mitigation, and details how to manage the outbreak collectively if it spreads globally’ (Donfried and Ischinger 2020).

The US and Europe should work together to reform and strengthen the World Health Organization so that it can provide ‘an early warning commitment not only by national governments but also by regional health authorities, research labs, and companies to report outbreaks of epidemic diseases’ (Donfried and Ischinger 2020). Pandemics, however, are just one of the many global challenges that require enhanced cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic. Climate change is becoming the defining issue of the twenty-first century, and one that no single country can tackle on its own (Haass 2020b, 192). Terrorism, cybersecurity and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are some of the other global challenges that we face today that require a strong transatlantic partnership.

Migration and refugee issues are becoming a serious problem in world affairs. Whether people leave their countries for economic reasons, to avoid conflicts and civil wars or, increasingly, because of climate change, the numbers are rising. Currently, there are some 250 million migrants in the world (Haass 2020b, 123). This is another global problem that requires increased cooperation. This holds especially true for the EU and the US, since they have the capacity to address the causes and conditions that lead to migration and it is in both their interests to do this.

The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the limitations of nationalist and unilateral policies in confronting global challenges. The pandemic and the numerous other global challenges we face may, in the end, provide the impetus for a rejuvenated transatlantic partnership and ‘build a renewed sense of transatlantic solidarity that can last through this emergency and beyond’ (Donfried and Ischinger 2020).

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Social unrest in America highlights the challenges it faces

Social unrest in America highlights the challenges it faces

George Floyd’s killing brought back the demons of racial discrimination and injustice in America. Demons that even Barack Obama, the first African American to hold the highest office in the land, was not able to exorcise, writes Constantine Arvanitopoulos.

The image and symbolism of an African American man asphyxiated by the knee of a white policeman on his neck, while he lay handcuffed and harmless on the street, was bound to ignite a fire. The inflammatory rhetoric of President Trump, the “divider-in-chief”, added fuel to the fire. President Trump’s heavy-handed law and order approach and his orchestrated photo-op, with Bible in hand in front of the church across Lafayette park, revealed his priorities: stirring up his base in view of the November election, rather than uniting the country.

It is not the first time that incidents of racial injustice and inequality have sparked protests in America. Repeated acts of physical and psychological brutality against African Americans over the years have revealed the depth of the structural racism that persists in America today. The magnitude and spontaneity of the current outburst, with its mostly peaceful and very inclusive demonstrations, is indicative of generational exhaustion with this systemic injustice. The breadth of social unrest is only reminiscent of 1968.

In 1968, the protests began as an expression of anger against the killing of Martin Luther King Jr. and the oppression of African Americans. They encompassed the lack of economic and educational opportunities and opposition to the Vietnam war. Today, demonstrations take place against the backdrop of widened inequalities.

This tale of two cities, the hard truth that not everyone is sharing the splendour and the glory of the “shining city on a hill”, has become a stain on the canvas of American politics. Neoliberal economic policies, along with globalisation and the technological revolution, have widened inequalities. African Americans and other non-privileged social groups have been disproportionally affected by the pandemic and the ensuing unemployment of 40 million Americans. To top it all off, the triple crisis of the pandemic, the recession, and racial injustice have revealed a divided society and a polarised political system.

These divisions are deepened by a President that is constantly looking to erect walls rather than trying to unite the country. President Trump haserected walls everywhere from Mexico to the White House. Even the People’s House has now become walled off from the people.

The situation in the US could not have gone unnoticed by the rest of the world. JFK used to say that a country is as strong abroad as it is at home. Trump’s response to the triple crisis has raised doubts about America’s competence, diminishing the superpower’s standing in the world.

America’s failure to lead in this global pandemic crisis has created a power vacuum exploited mainly by China. China initially responded to the crisis through cover-up and denial. It then managed to contain the virus through Draconian policy measures. Now, it is exploiting the absence of American leadership by engaging in a public relations campaign in Europe and elsewhere. It not only sent medical equipment but has now committed to sharing the vaccine against the virus as an international public good.

The pandemic crisis has revealed the deep scars in transatlantic relations. Both sides of the Atlantic turned inward to face all aspects of the crisis, from medical shortages, to travel bans, to the vaccine. At the same time, the crisis was a stark reminder of the fact that global challenges, such as a pandemic or climate change, require cooperative responses. Transatlantic solidarity in the face of such challenges is a one-way street. It will need to wait for the next tenant of the White House.

Racial injustice has also previously had an impact on America’s image abroad. As Secretary of State, Dean Rusk said in 1963, «I am speaking of the problem of discrimination…Our voice is mute, our friends are embarrassed, our enemies are gleeful». The recent incidents have undermined the moral voice of a pluralistic and democratic America, a champion of human rights and tolerance. Trump’s crude nativism and rhetoric of dominance in the streets of America have sparked demonstrations in Europe and elsewhere.

The image of a weakened America, distracted and introverted, is bound to whet the appetite of revisionist authoritarian powers. From Iran, to China, to Russia, to Turkey, all the world’s autocrats have exploited the militarised over-reaction of the Trump administration and the absence of American leadership.

America has shown remarkable powers of resilience and renewal in its history. It has proved capable of adaptation and change. It came out of the Great Depression with a reinvigorated democracy and economy and emerged victorious in WWII to construct a lasting peaceful international liberal order. This time around, however, will take much more than an election. Trump’s successor will face a Herculean task in restoring America at home and abroad.